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Plaintiff, having taken a policy providing that the chattels insured
should remain in the building where they were when the policy was
issued, was permitted by the company's agent to remove the goods to
another building, and the insurance was continued in the new place by
a written clause attached to the policy by such agent. There was evidence that the agent was accustomed to grant such permissions, reporting the same in each case to the company, on blanks furnished by it for
that purpose. Held, sufficient to show authority of the agent to grant
such permission.
Where an insurance agent had authority to waive certain conditions in
the policy, the exercise of such power, after his agency has been revoked,
will bind the company, if the party dealing with him had no notice of
the revocation.
THE AUTHORITY OF AN INSURANCE AGENT.

The business of insurance in its various forms and under
various names is, at the present day, transacted, we might
say, exclusively by corporations, the percentage of that done
by co-operative or mutual companies being comparatively
nominal.

In

the nature

of things, therefore, it is patent at

first blush that the transactions with these insurance corporations or
agents
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of more

must be negotiated and perfected

or less extensive authority.

A

by

successful

operation of the insurance business, necessarily requires that
the company have its army of agents throughout the territory
where its operations are carried on.
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Some
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others direct the service of those under them.
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stituted for the purpose of adjusting losses, or for superintending and establishing agencies, or they may be general agents
having practically unlimited authority within the territory
assigned them. Yet others are recording, canvassing, surveying and soliciting agents, the latter class usually working under
a superior general agency. Inquiry will be directed chiefly to
the live questions which arise in every day practice with reference to the authority of all these various grades of agencies,
and the consequences of their acts, knowledge, etc., on the
respective companies which they represent. The recording
agent is usually furnished, by the company appointing him,
with policies signed in blank by the chief officers of the company, blanks for various kinds of indorsements, blotters,
advertising matter, etc. His real duty ordinarily is to write
and countersign policies, make indorsements and sundry
permits for additional insurance, change in the rate or hazard,
etc., etc. His acts in this connection bind the company from
the instant they are done as effectively as though done by the
controlling officers of the corporation.
The soliciting, canvassing or surveying agent, is one sent
,.ut by the general agent to solicit insurance for the companies
-which he represents. His actual authority is usually to solicit
and examine risks, report on the general status and desirability
<)f any risk proposed, the moral and physical hazard connected therewith, and in general the desirable or unfavorable
features of the offered risk. He is usually supplied with blotters advertising the merits of his company and similar advertising literature, but has no actual authority to sign policies,
make indorsements permitting additional insurance, or greater
hiazard by reason of a change in the. location of the property
covered, or increase of risk from whatsoever source. He
usually delivers the policy when it is sent him for delivery by
his principal, collects and accounts to his principal for the premium, and is paid a commission for his services. His commission, in fact, is usually exactly the same as that received
by local recording agents, and his duties, so far as appearances
are concerned, are practically the same as those of the latter,
except that the soliciting agent does not write any policies nor
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make any indorsements thereon, this being done upon his
advice and for him by the general agent who employs him.
These two general kinds of agents will be distinguished as
soliciting and recording agents. The recording agent, having
power to bind his principal by an indorsement, he may, for
his principal, waive any provision of the policy, or estop the
company from relying on any provision which he could, as
recording agent, alter or permit by an indorsement. He
reports to his principal his acts done in his line of duty, and
the company, upon this report, either ratifies or repudiates
those acts. Of course this repudiation does not affect any one
whose rights are at stake until notice of the repudiation by the
principal is brought home to him. For instance, the recording agent might write a policy for an amount greater than his
private instructions would warrant, but unless the assured had
notice of this limitation, the company will be bound.
It is a general principle of agency that the acts and knowledge of the agent done and ascertained to be within the scope
of the real or apparent authority of such agent will, in law,
be held to be the acts and knowledge of the principal so far
as the rights of third parties, who are ignorant of the restric-tions of the authority of the agent, are concerned. Thus, an
agent, having authority to make the usual indorsements and
permits for the company, has authority to permit the removal
of insured goods to another building, although the policy. forbids such removal without permission indorsed, and the company will be bound by the consent of the agent, although the
fact that the agent consented was never made known to the
company or ratified by it: Burlington Ins. Co. v. Th1relkeld,
(Ark.), 31 S. W. 265. And the exercise of the authority of
such agent will be binding even after that authority has been
expressly taken away by the company, the assured having noknowledge of such revocation: Id. When an agent has;
mailed his usual report of his acts, the law will presume that
it was received by the company in the absence of a showing
to the contrary. Notice and proof of loss may be waived by
parol, but this cannot be waived by a local recording agent of
the company, as it is not within the real or apparent scope of
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his agency: Burlington Ins. Co. v. Kennerly, (Ark.), 31 St W.
155. The recording agent has authority to strike out certain
provisions of a policy upon the same being objected to, and
bind :he company by the policy with such provisions stricken
out: Parsonsv. Ins. Co., (Mo.), 31 S. V. 117. And where
the policy provides that if the assured did not own the land
upon which the insured building was situated, this -fact must
appear in writing on the policy, or it will be void, but the
agent of the company who wrote the policy, having known
all the facts and bound the company with such knowledge, it
was held that the company was estopped from insisting on the
forfeiture: Id. And this is the rule, though the policy stipulates that additional insurance or increase of hazard, or other
change in the status of the insured property, be indorsed on the
policy in writing: Parsons v. Ins. Co., (Mo.), 31 S. W. 117.
These provisions, being inserted in the policies for the benefit
of the companies, they are not compelled to insist on them,
but may waive them, and a recording agent with authority to
make the necessary indorsement may waive the requirement
with like force and to the same effect as could the company:
Burlington Ins. Co. v. Kennerly, 31 S. W. 155. And the fact
that the recording agent fails to transmit to his principal a
copy of his indorsement on the policy permitting a removal
of the property covered, additional insurance or other consent
for a change of the status of things, and the company is
thereby kept in ignorance of the acts of its agent, and though
such conduct on the part of the agent be in direct disregard
of the instructions of his principal, yet the assured cannot be
thereby prejudiced in any of his rights under the policy, as
the neglect of the agent is a failure to perform a duty he owed
to his principal and not to the assured, and the company will
be bound by such acts, and must suffer the consequences of
the agent's neglect of duty and violation of instructions:
Glouster Mfg. Co. v. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, (Mass.), 497; Potter v.
Ins. Co., 63 Fed. 382. And a recording agent may waive a
provision of a policy requiring the payment of the premium
as a condition precedent to the taking effect of the insurance :
Ball & Sage Wagon Co., 2o Fed. 232. The acts of the agent

THE AUTHORITY OF AN INSURANCE AGENT.

having authority to collect the premium binds the company in
all he does in reference thereto, and where by its course of
business the company makes it a custom to look to the agent
for all premiums, whether collected by him or not, the policyholders becoming liable to the agent therefor, this is tantamount to a payment by the assured, and the fact that such
agent may neglect to collect or account for the premium will,
in no way, invalidate the policy, even though it contain an
express stipulation that it shall not be binding until the actual
payment of the premium: Elkins v. Ins. Co., 6 Atl. 224;
Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Humes, 113 Pa. 591, 8 Atl. 163;
Alexandcr v. Ins. Co., 67 Wis. 422, 3o N. W. 727. And this
is true, also, although the agent is guilty of violating his duty
to collect and forward the premium by reason of his being
merely a broker employed by the assured to obtain the insurance, and acts for the company only in delivering the policy
and collecting the premium therefor: UniversalFire Ins. Co. v.
Black, lO9 Pa. 535, I Atl. 523. And where the broker or
other collecting agent himself pays the premium on a policy
sent him for collection and looks to the assured for the amount,
the company will be bound by such payment, though the
assured do not really pay the broker until after a loss, if at
all: Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co. v. Erb, I12 Pa. 149, 4 Atl. 8;
ContinentalLzfe Ins. Co. v. Ashcraft, 3 Atl. 774. In such cases,
the agent to collect the insurance premium has satisfied himself
as to its payment, and when he is satisfied about the payment
of the premium, having been entrusted with a proper adjustment
of the same, the company for which he acts is in no position to
complain: Scott v. Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 238, IO N. W. 367;
Newark Machine Co. v. Ins. Co., 50 Ohio, 549, 35 N. E. Io6o.
On the same principle the agent to collect the premium may
even grant a longer time within which it may be paid than he
is expressly authorized to do: Farnum v. fits. Co., 83 Cal. 246,
23 Pac. 869.
A recording agent who has authority to countersign and
issue policies has authority to bind his principal by an oral
contract of insurance. So, where such an agent orally agrees
with an applicant that the insurance shall take effect at once
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or at some certain time, the policy to be issued and delivered
as soon as practicable, such a contract will bind the company,
which will be liable for a loss occurring after such an agreement and before the policy is reduced to writing and delivered: The Relief Fire Ins. Co. v. Shaw, 94 U. S. 574; DavenPort v. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276 ; Audubon v. Ins. Co., 27 N. Y.
216; Commercial Mutual MA'arine Ins. Co. v. Union Jlfut.
Ins. Co., i How. 318; Angel v. Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 171 ;
Fisk v. Cottinet, 44 N. Y. 538 ; Hardwick v. State Ins. Co.,
23 Or. 290, 31 Pac. 656; Potter v. Ins. Co., 63 Fed. 382;

North British & M1fercantile Ins. Co. v. Lambert, (Or.), 37 Pac.
909; King v. Heckla Ins. Co., 58 Wis. 5o8, i7 N. W.

297.

And this is the case, although there be no definite agreement
about the amount of premium or when it shall be paid: Audubon v. Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 216; Harron v. Ins. Co., 88 Cal. 6,
25 Pac. 982. The agent can make a valid parol contract of
insurance just as the company itself could: Sanborn v. Ins.
Co., 16 Gray, (Mass.), 448. And a stipulation in the policy
to the effect that it will not be binding until countersigned by
the agent will not effect the binding force of such oral con.tract: Post v. Ins. Co., 43 Barb. 35 1. Nor need it be affirmatively shown that the agent had authority to bind his principal
by a parol agreement: Stickley v. Ins. Co., 37 S. C. 56, 16
S. E. 28o. Likewise, where the agent agrees that the company shall be bound from the time the premium is paid, it
will be liable for a loss before the policy is actually issued, but
after the payment of the premium: Knox v. Ins. Co., 50 Wis.
671, 7 N. W. 776 ; Knox v. Ins. Co., 5o Wis. 680, 7 N. W.
780.
Policies of insurance usually contain a stipulation substantially as follows : "This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be
void if the insured now has, or shall hereafter make or procure,
any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on
property covered in whole or in part by this policy." Frequently in litigation this and other named causes of forfeiture
are set up by the companies in avoidance of an action on the
policies. And, as a general rule, such stipulations are upheld
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and a violation of the requirements are fatal. But, on the
other hand, the fact that the agent issuing the policy may have
been fully apprised of all the facts material to the risk in apt
time, and that he issued the policy with full knowledge of the
fact. which otherwise would incur a forfeiture, is likewise often
set up by the plaintiffto defeat the forfeiture. Then the question arises, what is the effect of such knowledge of the agent
on the contract of insurance ? The trend of the decisions is
uriquestionably to the effect that such knowledge of the agent,
obtained in connection with the taking and negotiating for the
insurance and by the insured in good faith conveyed to the
agent, as such, will be held to be the knowledge of the company, and the company will not be permitted to claim a forfeiture of a policy on the ground of the existence of a fact which
would avoid the policy, when, at the time of issuing the policy,
the company, either directly or through its authorized agent,
had knowledge of such fact. Nor can the force of this
proposition be weakened by a stipulation in the policy to the
effect that the agent taking the insurance shall be deemed the
agent of the assured and not of the company: St. Paul Fire
& iirarine Ins. Co. v. Parsons,47 Minn. 352, 5o N. W. 240;
Follette v. Ins. Co., 107 N. C. 240, 12 S. E. 370 ; New Orleans
Ins. Assn. v. Mathews, 65 Miss. 312, 4 So. 62; Ins. Co. v.
Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222 ; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Ilarvey, 82
Va. 949, 5 S. E. 553 ; O'Brien v. Ins. Co., 52 Mich. 131, 17
N. W. 726; Kahn v. Ins. Co., 34 Pac. 1059; Eilenberger v.
Ins. Co., 89 Pa. 464; Wheaton v. Ins. Co., 76 Cal. 415, 18
Pac. 758 ; Indiana Ins. Co. v. Capehart, io8 Ind.270, 8 N. E.
285 ; Rowley v. Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. 550; Kansalv. Ins. Co.,
31 Minn. 17 ; Ins. Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234; Stone v. Ins.
Co., 68 Iowa, 737, 28 N. W. 47 ; Columbia Ins. Co. v. Cooper,
50 Pa. 331; Masters v. Ins. Co., I I Barb. 624; PeoriaFire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Hall, 12 Mich. 202; Meyers v. Ins. Co.,
156 Pa. 420, 27 Atl. 39. In Planters' Ins. Co. v. Meyers,
55 Miss. 479, 499, the policy sued on contained this provision:
" It is a part of this contract that any person, other than the
assured, who may have procured this insurance to be taken
by the company, shall be deemed to be the agent of the
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assured . . . and not of this company under any circumstances

whatever, in any transaction relating to this insurance." The
court in a very able and convincing opinion held that such a
stipulation could not change the real status of the agency, and
that the acts and knowledge of the agent were nevertheless
chargeable to the company. Passing upon a similar provision
in a policy, the Supreme Court of Arkansas says: " The fault
rests with the solicitor; to whom shall it be imputed? He
acted on behalf of the company and it aiccepted the fruits of
his work; but it is said that he was a ' solicitor' and not an
' agent' of the company and that the applicaton ecited that
in 'writing out answers to questions in it and prparing a
diagram, he acted as the agent of the insured. For convenience in the conduct of its business the company may make
the above classification of its agencies, but it cannot disown
any one by classifying them. Neither can its declaration override the facts, nor a fiction dissolve existing relations;" Sprott
v. Ils, Assn., 53 Ark. 216, 222, 13 S. W. 799, Again, it was
held in 11ome Ins. Co. v. Gibson, (Miss.), 17 So. 13, that a
stipulation in a policy as follows : " No officer, agent or other
representative of this company shall have power to waive any
provision or condition of this policy except such as by its
terms may be the subject of agreement endorsed hereon or
aided hereto," will not preclude the company from estopping
itself by the acts or knowledge of its agent. The court quoted
with approval the following language of the Supreme Court
of Michigan in the case of Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143 :
"There can be no more force in an agreement in writing not
to agree by parol, than in a parol agreement not to agree in
writing. Every such agreement is ended by the new one
which contradicts it." This language also received approving
sanction in M4orrison v. Ins. Co., 69 Tex. 353, 6 S. W. 605 ;
Lamberton v. Ins. Co., 39 Minn. 129, 39 N. W. 76; Kahn v.
Ius. Co., 34 Pac. 1O59, and other cases. To same effect see
Xict. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 58 Fed. 723 ; 41]ix v.
Ins. Co., 32 Atl. 46o. An apparently contrary doctrine seems
to prevail in Vermont: Smith v. Ins. Co., 6o Vt. 682, 15 Atl.
353. But the reasoning of the case is well met by that of
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Lamberton v. Ins. Co., supra, wherein the court says : " The
restriction here is so broad that it applies alike to every officer,
agent or representative of this company, and, as a corporation
can only act through such agencies, the substance of the
provision under consideration is that the company shall not
be held to have waived any of the terms or conditions of the
policy. That is to say, in other words, that one of the parties
to a written contract, which is not required by law to be in
writing, cannot, subsequent to the making of the contract,
waive, by parol agreement, provisions which had been incorporated in 'the contract for his benefit. A contracting party
cannot so tie his own hands, so restrict his own legal capacity
for future action, that he has not the power, even with the
assent of the other party, to bind or obligate himself by his
further action or agreement contrary to the terms of the
written contract." This is self-evident. The clause of this
policy relied upon as expressly restricting the power of the
agent whose conduct is here in question, is of that character.
If it is effectual at all, as a limitation on the power of future
action, it limits the power of every agent, officer and representative of the company, and hence, practiially, that of the
corporation. It is no more applicable to this particular agent
than to all of those to whom the conduct of affairs of the corporation is committed. In that broad scope, and as applicable
to all the representatives of the corporation, it cannot be
enforced so as to render inoperative such subsequent action or
agreement of corporate agents as would, if it were not for this
clause in the contract, be deemed the effectual action or agreement of the corporation.
This reasoning is unquestionably forcible. Suppose an
insurance corporation, by resolution or other proper action of
its board of directors, should delegate to a certain person the
general and exclusive control and management of its business.
Such person could of course bind his principal in all matters
pertaining to contracts of insurance with his company. But
suppose that this person should have inserted in all policies of
his company a clause similar to the one considered by the
Minnesota court. Suppose a loss occurs. A controversy
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arises over the amount due or over other matters. The policy
may limit the time within which an action thereon may be
brought to six months. The general manager may inveigle
the assued into deferring a suit by promises and assurances
that the claim will be settled without a resort to the courts.
'The assured knows that the manager has general authority,
imposes confidence in his assurances and suggestions, and
negotiations for a settlement pends until it is too late to bring
the action. Is there a court of last resort in the land that
would not hold the company, by the acts of its general agent
and manager, estopped from taking advantage of the six
months limitation provided in the policy, or, for like reasons,
any other conditions imposing a forfeiture where the assured
is in no sense at fault, and the agent dealing with him wholly
so ?
In harmony with this contention, it is held that where
the agent writing the policy at the time of negotiating for
the insurance has knowledge of other insurance which,
according to the stipulations of the policy, would render
it void, and nevertheless accepts the risk, writes and delivers
the policy and collects and retains the premium with such
knowledge, this knowledge will be chargeable to the company, and it cannot take advantage of the clause in the policy
forbidding the other insurance: Collins v. Jns. Co., 79 N.
C. 279; Haruthal v. Ins. Co., 88 N. C. P ; Union Ins. Co.
v. MurPy, 4 Atl. 352; Palmer v. Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 20;
Ailler v. Ins. Co., 70 Iowa, 704, 29 N. W. 411 ; Kahn v.
Ins. Co., (Wyo.), 34 Pac. 1059; Carrugi v. Ins. Co., 40 Ga.
140; Hammond v. Ins. Co., 62 N. W. 883, reversing 6o
N. W. 1095; Russell v. Ins. Co., 55 Mo. 585; Pitney v.
Glenn's Falls Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 6; Anderson v. Ins. Co.,
63 N. W. 241 ; Pechiner v. Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 195 ; Ins. Co.
v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143; Beebe v. Ins. Co., 93 Mich. 514,
53 N. W. 818; Rockford Ins. Co. v. Farmer's State Bank,
50 Kan. 427, 31 Pac. lO63; Shafer v. Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 361,
io N. W. 381 ; Capitol Ins. Co. v. Bank of Pleasanton, 50
Kan. 449, 31 Pac. 1O69; Fire Assn. v. Laning, (Tex. Civ.
App.), 31 S.W. 68 ; Sprottv. Ins. Co., 53 Ark. 215, 13 S.W.
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799; Crescent Ins. Co. v. Camp, 71 Tex. 505, 9 S. W. 473;
Harrinanv. Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 71, 5 N. W. 12; Eagle Fire
Ins. Co. v. Globe Loan & Trust Co., 62 N. W. 895; Gans v.
Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 108; .Ahetuaf Reserve Fund Life Assn. v.
Sullivan, (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 19o; Burson v. Fire
Assn., 136 Pa. 267, 2o Atl. 401; Haire v. Ins. Co., 93 Mich.
481, 53 N. W. 623; Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co. v.
Sheffy, 71 Miss. 922, 16 So. 307; Home Ins. Co. v. Gibson,
(Miss.), 17 So. 13; Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark.
II, I I S. W. ioi6. This is the rule, too, though the application for the insurance expressly stipulate that " the applicant
hereby declares and warrants that the above answers are true
and no statement contradictory to the above was made to or
by the agent of the company, and he agrees that this declaration should be the basis of and form part of the contract or
policy between the assured and the company:" -Robinson v.
Ins. Co., 93 Mich. 553, 53 N. W. 821; Beebe v. Ins. Co.,
supra. The law makes it the duty of the agent to disclose to
his principal all facts of which he may have knowledge and
which affect the risk, and if he fail to do so, the companynot the assured-must abide the consequences: Harriman v.
Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 71, 5 N. W. 12; Hamilton v. Ins. Co.,
I5 Mo. App. 59.
Where the company is advised of the additional insurance,
either by reason of its own knowledge of the facts, or through
the knowledge of its agent, chargeable to it, it must, either
itself, or through its agent object to such other insurance and
cancel the policy and return the assured his proper proportion
of the premium. Failing to do which, the company will be
estopped from setting up a forfeiture: 4o Mo. 557. "The
object of requiring leave to take insurance in another company
to be indorsed on a policy is to give notice of the additional
policy, and where the same agent represents both companies
and recommended and issued the additional policy, the original
company cannot set up such failure of indorsement as a defense
to a suit on its policy:" Russell v. Ins. Co., 55 Mo. 585.
And parol evidence is admissible to prove a waiver of such
condition, though the policy require the permission to be in
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writing : Pechner v. Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 195 ; Wilkinson v. Ins.
Co., 1i Wall. 222; Ameican CentralIns. Co. v. Mc Crea,Mary
& Co., 8 Lea, (Tenn.), 513, 523. If there be a controversy
as to whether the agent waived the notice or not, or whether
he ha.d knowledge of facts which would imply a waiver, the
matter on this issue would resolve itself into a question of fact
for a jury to determine: Pitney v. Glenn's Falls ns. Co., 65
N. Y. 6.
The general rule is, also, that a company will be liable for
the fraud or mistakes of its agents, and where an agent issued
a po!icy for three years by mistake when it was only intended
that it. should remain in force one year, which was delivered
to the assured as written, and he accepted it in good faith, not
knowing that the agent had made a mistake, and was not
apprised of such mistake until after a loss, it was held that the
company was liable for the loss suffered within the three years,
though after one year: Dwelling House Ins. Co., 153 Pa. 324,
25 AtL 757. And where an insurance company has knowledge of the true title of the assured, but its agent through
mistake writes the policy for the full value of the fee in the
land, instead of the actual interest of the assured, which was
correctly stated in the application to be only a life estate, the
company will be liable on the policy as written, and will not
be permitted to set up the mistake of its agent to defeat a
recovery: .ilfichigan Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Leon, (Ind. Sup.),
37 N. E. 584; Welsk v. London Assur. Corp., I51 Pa. 607,
25 Atl. 142; Creed v. Sun Fire Offce, (Ala.), 14 So. 323;
Dailey v. Pref.Mut. Acc. Assn., (Mich.), 57 N. W. 184; See,
also, Mankattan Ins. Co. v. Webster,, 59. Pa. 227; Bourgeois v.
Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 402, 57 N. W. 38. So, where an agent
issues a policy, knowing of incumbrances or liens on thd
property in violation of the provisions of the policy, such
incumbrances cannot be set up as a defense to an action, on
the policy: Shefer v. Plenix Ins. Co., 58 Wis. 35 1, IO N.W.
381; Harriman v. Ins. Co., 4 9 Wis. 71, 5 N. 'W. 12; Harrington, v. Ins. Co., 66 Hun, 628, 21 N. Y. 31 ; West Coast
Lumber Co. v. Ins. Co., 98 Cal. 502, 33 Pac. 258; Equitable
Fire Ins. Co. v. Alexander, (Miss.), 12 So. 25 ; Hartford Fire
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Ins. Co. v. Haas, 87 Ky. 531, 9 S. W. 720; Hmne Ins. Co. vGibson, 17 So. 13. On the same principle a warranty in a
policy requiring a clear space to be maintained between the
property insured and other property will be regarded in law
as waived where the agent who writes and delivers the policy
is cognizant, at the time, of the want of such space (Liverpool,
London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Lumber Co., (Miss.), 17 So. 445),
and the onus is on the insurer to establish a breach of the
warranty: Id.
An agent having authority to countersign
and deliver policies, has also authority to waive a requirement
of the policy that the assured shall keep his books and inventories in a fireproof safe: Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown,
123 Ill. 356, 15 N. E. 166.
And if the property be vacant,
at the time of writing the insurance, to the knowledge of the
agent, it will be binding: Rochester Loan & Banking Co. v.
Ins. Co., 62 N. W. 877.
There are a few cases which hold that where the policy of
insurance itself limits the powers and authority of the agent
issuing the policy to certain definite and specified acts, and
expressly repudiates his authority as to all other acts, that this is
notice to the assured accepting the policy of the limitations
placed on the authority of the agent, and the assured will not be
protected in relying on any oral waiver or assurances of the
agent in any other matters pertaining to the insurance contract or matters that may affect it either presently or subsequently, which are not embodied in the express authority
conferred, or which are forbidden by that expressly withheld :
Cleaver v. Traders' Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 527, 32 N. W. 66o;
Hlankins v. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. I, 35 N. W. 34; O'Reiley v.
London Assur. Corp. ioi N. Y. 575, 5 N. E. 568; Kyte v.
"Com. Union Assur. Co., 144 Mass. 43, 1o N. E. 518; Enos v.
Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 621, 8 Pac. 379. It is otherwise, however,
where there is no express stipulation in the policy that the
agent may not waive any of its conditions: Silverbergv. Ins.
Co., 67 Cal. 36, 7 Pac. 38; Schoener v. Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 575,
7 N. W. 544; Alexander v. Ins. Co., 67 Wis. 422, 3o N. W.
727; O'Brien v. Ins. Co., 22 Fed. 586; Cohen v. Ins. Co., 67
Texas, 325, 3 S. W. 296; Ball and Sage Wagon Co. v. Ins.

THE AUTHORITY OF AN INSURANCE AGENT.

Co., 20 Fed. 232. But certainly none of these cases could be
construed as holding that an insurance company can completely shear its agent of authority and at the same time
accept his services as agent, and the results of the duties
necessarily incumbent on him as such. If they do, it suffices
to say that they are in the very teeth of the great weight of
modern authority, contrary to reason, and not sustained by
principle: Beebe v. Ins. Co., 93 Mich. 514, 53 N. W. 818;
Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143 ; Rockford Ins. Co. v. Farmers'
State Bank, 5o Kan. 427, 31 Pac. io63; Shafer v. Ins. Co.,
53 Wis. 361, IO N. W. 381; Capitol Ins. Co. v. Bank of
Pleasanton, 5o Kan. 449, 31 Pac. lO69; Kahn v. Ins. Co.,
(Wyo.), 34 Pac. 1059; Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Brodie, 52
Ark. I I, I I S. W. io16, and authorities cited. But a local
recording agent has no authority to receive notice of loss:
Edwards v. Ins. Co., 75 Pa. 378, nor can he waive proofs of
loss required by the policy. This is not within his real or
apparent authority. His province is to pass upon the risk,
w-ite the policy, collect the premium, etc. But after a loss,
there is nothing for the local agent to do. He is not authorized to pay or adjust the loss in any sense, and has nothing
to do with that which is required by the assured to be done
after the loss in order to effect a recovery or payment of the
amount called for by the policy: Harrisonv. Ins. Co., 59 Fed.
732; Von Genecltin v. Ins. Co., 75 Iowa, 544, 39 N. W. 881.
Perhaps one of the most fruitful sources of litigation and contention in the settlement of losses is where the application for
insurance states matters which, if true, and properly authorized, would cause a forfeiture of all rights under the policy.
These applications, too, are usually filled by the agents of the
companies who solicit risks and work up the business in their
locality for their principals. The courts generally hold that
where the agent of the company takes the application, fills out
the answers to the questions therein propounded to the applicant, and does so by writing incorrect answers or stating facts
therein not authorized by the applicant, and procures the signature of the applicant thereto after having written out the
answers, he having made correct answers in good faith to all

THE AUTHORITY OF AN INSURANCE AGENT.

the interrogatories, and such agent sends the application so
filled out to the company which issues a policy thereon,
delivers same and receives the premium therefor, the policy
will not be invalidated by reason of any falsity of any of the
answers contained in the application and made so by the
agent taking the same, but the company will be chargeable
with the knowledge of its agent received in connection with
the preparation of the application, and will be estopped from
setting up a forfeiture by reason of any such false statements:
Corbitt v. Ins. Co., 3o N. Y. IO69; Providence Life Assurance Soc., 58 Ark. 528, 25 S. W. 835 ; ContinentalIns. Co. v.
Pierce, 39 Kan. 396, 18 Pac. 291; Dwelling House Ins. Co. v.
Brodie, 52 Ark. II, II S. W. ioi6; Purditzky v. Ins. Co., 72
Wis. 492, 4o N. W. 386; McArthur v. Home Life Assn., 73
Iowa 336, 35 N. W. 430; Temmik v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 72 Mich. 388, 4o N. W.. 469; Commercial Union Assur.
Co. v. Elliott, 13 Atl. 970; Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222; Sullivan v. Ins. Co., 34 Kan. 170,
8 Pac. 112; State Ins. Co. v.Jordan, 29 Neb. 514, 45 N. W.

792; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Fallon, (Neb.), 63 N. W. 86o;
Kansel v. Ins. Co., 31 Minn. 17, 16 N. XV. 430; Deitz v. Ins.
Co., 31 W. Va. 851, 8 S. E. 616; American Life Ins. Co. v.
Mahone, 21 Wall. 152; N. j. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Baker,
94 U. S. 61o; Woodbury Savings Bank and Bldg. & Loan
Assn., 31 Conn. 517; Beebe v. Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 51; Colum-

hia Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 5o Pa. 331; Rowley v. Ins. Co., 36
N. Y. 550 ; &Ienberger v. Ins. Co., 89 Pa. 464 ; Rockford Ins.
Co. v. Nelson, 65 Ill. 415; Hingston v. Ins. Co., 42 Iowa 46;
Planters' Iis. Co. v. Meyers, 55 Miss. 479; Stone v. Hawkeye
Ins. Co., 68 Iowa, 737, 28 N. W. 47; Phuniz Ins. Co. v.
Allen, IO9 Ind. 273, IO N. E. 85; Bradnup v. Ins. Co., 27

Minn. 393, 7 N. W. 735 ; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v.
Hazelwood, 75 Tex. 348, 12 S. W. 621 ; Syndicate his. Co. v.
Catcliings, (Ala.), 16 So. 46; O'Rourke v. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y.
215; Bernard v. United Life Ins. Assn., 33 N. Y. 22;
MIullin v. is. Co., 58 Vt. 113, 4 Atl. 817; Germania Fire
Ins. Co. v. Hick, 125 Ill. 361, 17 N. E. 792; Sprott v. N. 0.
Ins. Assn., 53 Ark. 215, 13 S. W. 799; Eggleston v. Ins. Co.,
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Iowa, 308, 21 N. W. 652; Wheaton v. Ins. Co., 76 Cal.

415,-18 Pac. 758; Sawyer EquitableAec. Ins. Co., 42 Fed. 3o;

Pacific Mit. Li'e fins. Co. v. Snowden, 58 Fed. 342; Hingstonv.
Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 46. And the rule is the same whether the
applicant can read and write or not: Home Fire Ins. Co. v.
Fallon, supra. And such filling out of the application is within
the scope of the authority of a soliciting agent: Rowley v.
Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. 55o: jfcArthur v. Ins. Co., 73 Iowa, 336,
35 N. W. 430; Pro'V. L /e Assur. Soc. v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark.
528, 25 S. W. 835; Union Jllut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13
Wall. 222. Where an insurance company furnishes its agent
with blank applications for insurance, the law presumes that
such agent has authority from his principal to use them:
.Donnelly v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co., 70 Iowa, 693, 28 N. W.
607.

It has been held in some cases that a soliciting agent, who
has only authority to solicit applications for insurance, to forward them to the company for its acceptance, to fix rates of
insurance and report on the risk in general, to deliver the
policy when issued by the company or its general agents, and
to collect and account to them for the premium on the same,
but who has not authority to issue and countersign policies or
write indorsements thereon, has no actual or implied authority
to vary the terms of the policy, to waive any of its provisions,
or, by his knowledge or conduct, to estop the company from
setting up any forfeiture by reason of a violation of any of the
terms of the policy: Lizverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co. v.
Shuster, 63 Miss. 431; Putnam Tool Co. v. Ins. Co., 145
Mass. 265, 13 N. E. 9o2; Liverpool, London & Globe fns.
Co. v. Sorsby, 6o Miss. 202; American Ins. Co. v. Hampton,
54 Ark. 75, 14 S. W. 1092; Armstrong v. State Ins. Co., 61
Iowa, 212, I6 N. W. 94; Critchett v. Jis. Co., 53 Iowa, 404,
5 N. W. 543 ; Strickland v. Ins. Co., 66 Iowa, 466, 23 N. W.
926; Russell v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co., 78 Iowa, 216, 42
N. W. 654; Smity v. Ins. Co., 6 Dak. 433, 43 N. W. 8io.
And the fact that the company may furnish such agent with
printed advertising matter such as calendars, blotters, etc.,
advertising the agency of such solicitor, will not make him
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any other than a soliciting agent, or, in any sense, enlarge the
powers conferred upon him: Putnam Tool Co. v. Ins. Co.,
supra; Armstrong v. Ins. Co., supra. But by far the better
reason and the unquestioned weight of authority is to the
effect that the soliciting agent may waive provisions of the
policy. The theory of one class of cases is that, as he has
no authority to sign a policy or make a contract of insurance,
he cannot waive that which he would not be authorized to
effect as a valid contract. The reasoning of the other cases
is that he is selected by the company, is not selected by the
assured, does not act for the assured ; all transactions whatever in regard to the insurance are carried on through him ;
he goes upon the ground at the request of his principal;
examines risks; makes rates; prepares diagrams of the
property showing the exposures; reports on the physical,
moral, and general hazard of the risk; takes the application
for insurance; usually fills it up and explains its effect and
nature to the uninitiated insured ; forwards the application to
his principal, whether the latter be a general agent with control of a certain territory or the company itself, who sends the
policy to the solicitor for delivery as requested, relying in
large part and perhaps entirely, in passing on the risk. upon
whether the report of the soliciting agent is favorable or
unfavorable. The solicitor collects the premium when delivering the policy, and thus the contract of insurance is consurnmated, and the assured, usually unacquainted with the technical
distinctions and hair-splitting legal differences between a soliciting and a recording agent, has effected his insurance with the
solicitor whom he regards as in every sense the agent of the
company, and whose acts and doings the company accepts
and profits by. The acts and knowledge of such soliciting
agent done and received in connection with the negotiations
and perfection of the insurance contract, are, in law, the acts
and knowledge of the principal who sent the agent out with
instructions to get insurance business, and who is stimulated
to diligent efforts not only by being urged to this effect, but
by the promise and assurance of a liberal commission on all
thc insurance he can control. So, where an application is.
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made to the soliciting agent for certain insurance, and he is
advised that the applicant intends to obtain additional insurance on the same property, this is, in effect, an application for
a policy, which would permit such other insurance, and, if the
agent fails to have such a policy issued, the company will not
be permitted to take advantage of any want of mention in the
policy of the additional insurance: Brandon v. Ins. Co., 27
Minn. 393, 7 N. W. 735; Wood, Ils., Sec. 386. And, though
such soliciting agent never notifies his company of the existing or contemplated additional insurance, the rule is the same:
McEwen v. Ins. Co., 5 Hill, ioi. This, also, although the
policy, by its very terms, requires that additional insurance
shall be indorsed on the same in writing, or it will be void:Id. To same effect, see .itchen v. Ins. Co., 57 Mich. 135, 23
N. W. 616; Plzwnix Ins. Co. v. Spiers, 87 Ky. 285, 8 S. W.
453 ; Wilkinson v. Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 222. This rule is well
expressed in forcible language by the Supreme Court of'
Illinois in the case of American Ins. Co. v. Luttrell, 89 Ill. 314,
as follows: "The assured fully disclosed to the agent of the
appellant at the time of making the application that he held
this insurance policy in the Phoenix Company. He concealed
nothing from the appellant or his agent. Appellant, with full
knowledge of these facts, accepted the application in the
condition in which it was, and issued the policy upon it and
accepted the premium which was paid upon it. To hold this
policy void under such circumstances would be simply allowing
the insurance company to practice an unblushing fraud upon
the insured. It was well known to the company when they
accepted the premium upon this policy, and issued it as a
valid policy to appellee, that there was additional insurance
upon the property as it is now. Having thus declared it
valid to the assured, the assured having paid his premium
upon the faith of that declaration by the company, the company cannot now be permitted to say that it is invalid upon
that ground." And the Minnesota court in Kansal v. Ins.
Co., 31 Minn. 17, 2o, thus states the doctrine: " On principle, as well as for considerations of public policy, agents
of insurance companies, authorized to procure applications
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for insurance and to forward them to the companies for
acceptance, must be deemed the agents of the insurers, and
not of the insured, in all that they do in preparing the application or in any representation they may make to the insured as
to the character or effect of the statements therein contained.
This rule is rendered necessary by the manner in which
business is now usually done by the insurers. They supply
these agents with printed blanks, stimulate them by the promise
of liberal commissions, and then send them abroad in the
community to solicit insurance. The companies employ them
for that purpose, and the public regard them as the agents
of the companies in the matter of preparing the applications, a
fact which the companies perfectly understand. The parties
who are induced by these agents to make applications for
insurance rarely know anything about the general officers of
the company, but look to the agent as the full and complete
representative in all that is said or done in regard to the application. And in view of the apparent authority with which the
companies clothe these solicitors, they have a perfect right to
consider them such." To like effect, see Malleable .ron Works
v. Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 465; Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 94 Mo. 353,
7 S. W. 261 ; Fisk v. Cottenet, 44 N. Y . 538 ; Woodbury Satings Bank v. Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 517 ; Miller v. Ins. Co., 3 1
Iowa, 216; American Fire Ins. Co. v. Luttrell, 89 Ill. 314;
Hough v. Ins. Co., 29 Conn. IO; Sexton v. Ins. Co., 9 Barb.
191 ; Jordan v. Ins. Co., 64 Iowa, 216, 19 N. W. 919; Boet.her v. Ins. Co., 47 Iowa, 253; Hardin v. Ins. Co., 90 Va.
413, 18 S. E. 911 ; Forward v. Ins. Co., 142 N. Y. 382, 37
N. E. 615 ; Ellis v. Ins. Co., 5o N. Y. 402 ; Masters v. f7zs.
Co., ii Barb. 624; Wilkinson v. Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 222; Ful-

lette v. U. S. Mut. Acc. Assn., I IO N. C. 377, 14 S. E. 923
Continental Ins. Co. v. Ruckman, 127 Ill. 364, 2o N. E. 77;
Bergeron v. Ins. Co., III N. C. 45, 15 S. E. 88 3 . In the latter
case the North Carolina Court thus lays down the rule: "The
principle has been more than once announced by this court
that, where a soliciting agent is informed before the policy is
issued of a fact which, if fraudulently concealed by the applicant
would constitute a ground of forfeiture under one of its con-
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ditions, and afterwards receives the premium and delivers the
policy, his knowledge is imputed to his principal, and whether
he actually communicates the fact to the principal office of the
company or not, the condition is deemed to have been waived.
These rulings rest upon the principle that to permit the insurer
to gather into its coffers premiums collected by one of its
local agents, and continue to recognize the validity of the
contract made through him until it becomes apparent that a
loss has occurred, and then, for the first time, to repudiate the
agency, would be to lend the sanction of the law to a palpable
fraud." It is further held that the acts and knowledge of a
clerk done and received while soliciting insurance for his principal, who is a recording agent, is chargeable to the recording
agent, and, through him, to the company itself, and it will be
bound accordingly: ifennett v. Ins. Co., 70 Iowa, 600, 31 N.
W. 948; McGonigle v. Ins. Co., 31 Atl. 868; Pianix hIs.
Co. v. Jard,(Tex. Civ, App.), 26 S. W. 763 ; Arffv, Ins. Co.,
125 N. Y. 57, 25 N, E. 1073 ; Bergeron v. Ins. Co,, iiI N.
C. 45, 15 S. E. 383; Continental Ins. Co. v. Ruckmian, 127
Ill. 364, 2o N. E, 77. Of course such clerks are practically
soliciting agents. If there is any difference, they have not
as much authority as a soliciting agent. Again, too, on the
same principle the courts hold the acts and knowledge of a
medical examiner of a life company, in connection with the
proposed risk, to be that of the company, and chargeable to it,
And when the assued states facts in good faith to the medical
examiner who writes down the answer as he contends it should
be written, or fails to write it all, deeming it unnecessary, or makes
use of technical expressions which do not convey the correct
answer of the assured, or, in short, in any way misleads the
applicant to his prejudice in filling up the application or
directing the way to answer a question, all such acts are the
acts of the company through its medical examiner whom it
has appointed for the purpose of taking the applicatin, and,
through such examiner, are chargeable to the company and it
will be estopped from insisting on a forfeiture by reason of any
untrue statement caused by the suggestion of such examiner,
or any omission of duty of such examiner to make known to
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the company the full purport of the examination and answers,
and this though the policy itself makes the answers warranties
and their falsity a breach of the contract and forfeiture.
AfrtualBczefit Lffc Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 58 Fed. 723 ; Prcz'idenceLife Asszr. Soc. v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 25 S. V. 835;
Purditrky v. Ins. Co., 76 Mlich. 428, 43 N. W. 373 ; 3licArthur
v. Home Life hns. Co., 73 Iowa, 336, 35 N. W. 430 ; Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. v. Haorle-wood, 73 Tex. 384. 12 S. W. 621.
Now it is patent that a medical examiner, like a "so!icitor,"
has no actual or implied authority to make an insurance contract and bind his principal thereby. But he is designated by
the company for the purpose of examining the applicant for
insurance from a medical and scientific standpoint, and is
selected by the company for his supposed fitness for this purpose. The company pays him for his services, and relies on
his integrity and ability in his special calling for the necessary
information to ascertain whether or not the proposed risk is
desirable or not. Such an examiner certainly can have no
more, if, indeed, as much, authority to represent his principal
as does the soliciting agent of the very same company, perhaps, who is appointed by the company itself or its general
agents for fhe purpose of soliciting risks, taking applications
therefor, delivering the policies, and collecting the premium.
Both are selected by their principals and not by the applicant
for insurance; both are accountable to their companies and
not to the assured; both are paid by their'employers and not
by those from whom they solicit insurance, and, within the
legitimate sphere of their action, both bind their principals by
their acts and knowledge in connection with the negotiation
for the insurance, and, of course, when the company is advised,
either directly or through its agents, of facts which would
defeat the policy, and, with such knowledge, still issues the
policy and takes the premium therefor, it will not be permitted
to set up a forfeiture by reason of such defect. Practically all
the cases are to this effect, and even if none were, the principle
of common sense, natural right, and natural justice would
forbid the companies from taking an unconscionable advantage
of the assured by their own studied wrong to his great injury,
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aind would override every contention to the contrary. But it
-.hould be borne in mind that the authority of a soliciting agent
to bind his company by his acts, declarations, and knowledge,
does not exist after the policy is delivered and the premium
collected. After that, the solicitor's agency is at an end and
no notice to him will effect or bind the company in any way:
Hamilton v. Ins. Co., I5 Mo. App. 59; Snedicor v. Ins. Co.
(Mich.), 64 N. W. 35. And the same doctrine applies to
brokers who are simply employed to deliver the policy, collect
the premium, etc.: .Hellon v. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 6o9. But it
is the duty of such solicitors and brokers to reveal to their
principals all information they may obtain affecting the risk in
connection with any or all of the duties the), perform in taking
the application, delivering the policy, and collecting the premium, and the applicant has a right to rely on the assurance
the law justifies that these agents will so discharge their duty
to their principals: IVitntey v. Xational 11asonic Acc. Assn.
(Minn.), 57 N. W. 943 ; Hamilton v. hits. Co., 15 Mo. App.
59. And a provision in the policy making the agent soliciting
the insurance the agent of the applicant will have no. force:
,71ers v. Ins. Co., 156 Pa. 420, 27 At. 39 ; Kaln v. Ins. Co.,
(wyo.), 34 Pac. 1059. The authority of the agent is not limited
by the written or oral appointment by the principal, but is coextensive with the apparent authority which induces, in the ordinary transactions of business, a belief that the agent possesses
that authority which would prompt a reasonable person to
believe that it existed to the full extent warranted from the
holding out of the agent to the world by the company:
Fariners& M1erchants Ins. Co. v. Chestnut, 50 Ill. IiI ; Keeler
v. his. Co., 16 Wis. 523 ; Kenton v. Ins. Co-, 6 Bush., (Ky.),
174; Union 31htt. hns. Co. v. IVilkinson, 13 Wall. 222 ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Farrish, 73 Ill. 166. And, as a general
rule, where the assured has no knowledge of any limitations
on the authority of the agent with whom he deMs, the extent
of the authority of such agent is a question of fact for the
jury : Houghi v. Cit , Fire hns. Co., 29 Conn. Io; Hardwick v.
hns. Co., 20 Or. 547, 26 Pac. 84o; Plhwnix Ins. Co. v. Stocks,
(Ill..App.), 36 N. E. 408. But an agent has no implied or.
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actual authority in law to issue a policy to himself. This rule
is based on the principal that the law will not permit one to
serve diverse interests: MVildbeiger v. Ins. Co., (Miss.), 17 So.
282 ; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Shrader, (Tex. Civ. App.), 3 1
S. W. I I oo. The authority of a recording agent, where disputed,
may be shown by advertising circulars, issued by the company
for which he acts, stating that such agent has -authority to
issue policies, where such circulars are brought to the knowledge of the person dealing with the agent in such capacity:
Frank v. Ins. Co., 62 N. W. 454.
There is still another class of agents who figure more or
less extensively in soliciting insurance and procuring policies.
Reference is had to so-called brokers. The extent of the
authority of these agents is usually not very difficult of ascertainment, but, to arrive at a correct determination of the
nature and scope of thejr authority, it is always necessary to
ascertain for whom they act, whether for the assured or
for the company or, possibly, for both. Ordinarily, like a
soliciting agent, the broker only binds his company in what he
does in delivering the policy and collecting the premium.
Within the scope of this authority he may bind his principle
by a neglect to collect the premium as directed. So, where a
policy is sent to a broker who is instructed to collect and
remit the premium, and he delivers the policy, collects the
premium, but fails to pay it to the company, the latter will be
liable, nevertheless, for a loss, though the policy provides that
it shall not be binding until the actual payment of the premium
to the assurer: Universal Fire hIs. Co v. Black, lO9 Pa. 535,
I Atl. 523; Crissvell v. Riley, 5 Ind. App. 496, 32 N. E. 814.
And so, the knowledge of a broker who is employed by an
agent of a company to procure business, for it is such knowledge of the company as will estop it from asserting a forfeiture of the policy which, though unknown to the company,
is known and ascertained by the broker through his negotiations for the insurance: Jzdlin v. Ins. Co., 58 Vt. 1 13, 4
Atl. 817. The acts and knowledge of such a broker are the
acts and knowledge of the company to the same extent that
they would be if the insurance had been negotiated through
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the agent instead of the broker: Riley v. Ins. Co., I Io Pa.
144, I Atl. 528. Of course, if the broker be employed by
the applicant to get the insurance for him, he will be the
agent of the applicant in all his acts in this direction: White
v. Is. Co., 120 Mass. 330. If, too, the company entrust the
broker with the policy to be delivered by him to the applicant
upon the payment of the premium, the broker, to this extent,
only, will represent the company. The status of the relation
of the broker to the company, or to the applicant, will, when
disputed, be usually a question of fact for a jury, and when
solved in this respect, the legal effect of the relation will not
be difficult. The applicant is bound as to everything the
broker does as his agent. On the other hand, it follows
necessarily that in all the broker does in behalf of the company, he is its agent, and it will be bound by his acts within
the scope of such agency.
In cases of losses insurance companies have agents for the
purpose of looking after and settling these. Agents for this
purpose are denominated adjusters. Their duties relate solely
to matters connected with the insurance contract after the loss
occurs. Consequently, no act or declaration of an adjustei in
regard to anything that might transpire before the loss could
bind his company, because it is not within the real or apparent
scope of the authority of such an agent to do any act in reference to the effecting of the insurance. But within the scope of
his authority, the adjuster, like any other agent, may bind his
principal by his acts and knowledge. And if a company sends
its adjuster to settle a loss under a policy, and the adjuster,
after looking into the case, notifies the assured that the company will not pay the loss, this will have the effect of putting
the assured and insurer at arms' length, and the former may
then sue without furnishing proofs of loss, or complying with
other like conditions precedent, which will have been waived
by tthe act of the adjusting agent, and, through him, by the
company itself: Parsons v. Ils. Co., (Mo.), 31 S. W. 117;
Kaln v. Ins. Co., (Wyo.), 34 Pac. 1059; East Tex. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 82 Tex. 635, IS S. W. 713; Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Hammang, (Neb.), 62 N. W. 883. And such denial of
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liability by the adjuster will deprive the company of the benefit
of a stipulation in the policy that it may have ninety days
within which to pay the loss after the receipt of notice and
satisfactory proofs of same, and suit may be begun on the
policy at once : German Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 53 Ark. 495, 14
S. W. 672. The sending of an adjuster to settle a loss of
itself vests him with the authority to agree on the-amount due
the assured by reason of the loss : Id. Bro-wn v. State Ins. Co.,
74 Iowa, 428, 38 N. W. 135. But where the assured relies
on a waiver by an adjuster, the onus is on him to show the
.authority of such agent: German Ins. Co. v. Davis,(Neb.). 59
N. W. 698. But where an adjuster has, with proper authority,
once adjusted a loss in which the insured was interested, the
latter is justified in relying on the authority of such adjtuster
to settle another loss for the same company, no revocation of
.authority having been brought home to the assured : Slater v.
11is. CO. 57 N.\W. 422. It has been held that an adjuster who
is selected by his principal for his special fitness in the line of
duty assigned him, cannot appoint another to act in his stead
without the consent of the company, and this is doubtless
sound law: Ruthven v. fns. Co., (Iowa), 6o N. W. 663. But see,
contra, Swain v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 37 Minn. 390, 34 N.
W. 738. In this last case, too, the adjuster had general
authority as such, and it was held that he had authority to
appoint others to assist him in his duties and work as such.
There is yet another class of agents with more extended
powers than any that have been considered. These are classed
as general agents. Some of the courts hold that local recording agents with authority to pass upon risks and issue policies
and collect the premium therefor, are general agents, and bind
the company by their acts: Ha/in v. Ins. Co., (Vyo.), 34 Pac.
1059. But these are not the general agents now under discussion, but rather such as have charge over a state or other
territory and exercise a general superintending control over
inferior agencies and the business of their principals generally
within the bounds of the territory to which they are assigned
for duty. Generally, it is not difficult to arrive at a correct
conclusion as to the scope and extent of powers of such
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agents. As the term imports, they have general authority,
and, possessing such, and having charge in this capacity over
large territory and extensive operations, they are not limited
in authority as a soliciting, Tecording, or other agent is, but
have full power and authority to bind their companies by
waivers of the teims of the policy and forfeitures in general,
and their acts and doings are practically tantamount tQ that
of the company itself: Wood v. Ins. Co., 32 .N. X. 619;
Hanithal v. Ins. Co., 88 N. C. 71 ; M1utual Life Ins. Co. v.
Nichols, (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. 998. . Of course; it makes
no difference if the policy stipulates that noc agent can waive
its terms and conditions: P1,a'nix hns. Co. v. Bow-vdrc, 67 Miss.
63 1, 7 So. 596; Wih v. Ins. C'o., 2 Colo. Appl. 484, 31 Pac.
389 ; State Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 14: Colo. 499, 24 Pac. 332 ;
Boctcleir v. hiz. Co., 47 Io Va, 253; Phwni"
aV.
o.
2liger, (Kan.), 30 Pa. 120; Carpenter v. is. Co., i35
N. Y. 298, 31 N. E. 1015 ; Bcrgeron v. Ins. Co.,. iii N.. C.
45, I5 S. E. 883; 3May, his., Sec. 131, 132; Befinetfv. Zits.
Co., 70 Iowa, 6oo, 31 N. XV. 948; Follette v. Assn, 107
N. C. 240, 12 S. E. 370.

The law requires the utmost good faith on the part of both
the assured and insurer. Neither will be permitted to perpetrate a wrong or injury on the other or take afiy unfair advantage. As has been seen, the difficulty usually arises in cades
where the authority of an agent is denied on the one hand and
maintained on the other. Under the various grades of agenby,
as we Ihave seen, many difficult questions often conffont both
the insured and insurer. The effort- hag been many to render
these questions as lucid as possible within the space consumed.
W. C. RODGERS.'
Nashvill, Ark., September, r895.

